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R distance of separation
r the smallest turning radius at a given speed
T maximum thrust force
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t time
V velocity
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angular velocity limit
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(') time derivative
(.) three-dimensional vector
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NONLINEAR ZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAME ANALYSIS BY SINGULAR
PERTURBATION METHODS
J. Shinar* and N. Farber%
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
A certain class of nonlinear, zero-sum differential games, exhibiting time-scale
separation properties, is suitable for analysis by singular-perturbation techniques.
The merits of such an analysis, leading to an approximate game solution, as well as
the "well-posedness" of the formulation, are discussed. The singular-perturbation
approach is shown to be particularly attractive for investigating pursuit-evasion
problems; the original multidimensional differential game is decomposed to a "simple
pursuit" (free-stream) game and two independent (boundary-layer) optimal-control
problems. Using multiple time-scale boundary-layer models in such games results in a
pair of uniformly valid zero-order composite feedback strategies. Though a priori
perfect information is assumed, the suboptimal strategies depend only on relative
geometry and own-state measurements. This is demonstrated by a three-dimensional,
constant-speed example. For game analysis with realistic vehicle dynamics, the tech-
nique of forced singular perturbations and a variable modeling approach is proposed.
Accuracy of the zero-order singular-perturbation analysis is evaluated by comparison
with the exact (numerical) solution of a time-optimal, variable-speed "game of two
cars" in the horizontal plane.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of differential games, coined by Isaacs (ref. 1), was intended ini-
tially to describe a mathematical framework for investigating pursuit-evasion problems.
Today, the general theory of differential games has a much larger horizon, but
pursuit-evasion games still attract a particular interest. However, the progress in
solving nonlinear games, representing realistic problems, has been slow and frustrat-
ing. Although it has been proved (refs. 2 and 3) that pursuit-evasion games with
separable convex dynamics and properly defined terminal manifolds have a saddle-point
solution, only games with very simple structures have been solved (refs. 3-6).
The basic reason for this unsatisfactory progress is the complex nature of the
game solution. First, a nonlinear, two-point, boundary-valve problem of high dimen-
sion, describing the set of necessary conditions of optimality, has to be solved.
Such a solution, generating candidate extremals, is valid only if those trajectories
do not reach singular surfaces of the game. And the existence of such surfaces of
discontinuity (either in the cost function or in its gradient) is a well-known
phenomenon (refs. 7 and 8) in differential game theory. For this reason the numerical
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techniques (refs. 9-12), which can provide a solution of the two-point boundary-value
problem, are of limited value. They also require anexcessive amount of computation,
prohibitive for real-time implementations, and provide only little insight for a sys-
tematical analysis. For such purposes a reasonable analytical approximation may be
of great value.
In analysis of differential games, where fast and slow variables can be dis-
tinguished, the method of singular perturbation -- successfully used in optimal control
of multiple time-scale systems (refs. 13-17) -- can be applied. By this technique the
original differential game can be decoupled to a set of lower-dimensional, analyti-
cally solvable subgames, enabling the synthesis of an approximation to the exact
solution.
There are, however, some conceptual difficulties to be overcome. The first
attempts to investigate singularly perturbed linear differential games (refs. 18-21)
revealed that because of the differences in the information structure between an
open-loop and closed-loop solution, some singularly perturbed differential games may
not be "well-posed" (i.e., the solution of the "slow" game does not approximate the
solution of the original one, even if the perturbation parameter, characterizing the
time-scale separation, tends toward zero). "Well-posedness" was, however, demon-
strated (ref. 18) for zero-sum linear games and it was conjectured (ref. 20) for cases
in which the "fast" game has identical closed-loop and open-loop solutions.
Other studies (refs. 22 and 23) clarified the significance of an approximate game
solution. By defining the outcome of a singularly perturbed, two-person, zero-sum
differential game -- in which both players follow approximate (synthesized_ strategies--
as the "extended value," it was demonstrated that
i. The difference between the extended value and the exact saddle-point value
is bounded on both sides
2. The extended value satisfies by itself a weak saddle inequality
3. The extended value tends, as a limit, toward the exact value of the singu-
larly perturbed game, as the singular perturbation parameter g approaches zero
4. The accuracy of the extended value for a zero-order approximation is pre-
dicted to be of the order of _2.
A class of pursuit-evasion games, analyzed by the technique of singular perturba-
tions, can be characterized by the following properties:
I. There is a time-scale separation between the variables describing the slow
relative geometry and the fast variations of vehicle dynamics
2. The dynamics of the relative geometry are separately controlled by the
players
3. The dynamics of the fast variables are independent of the slow ones
4. The fast vehicle dynamics are independently controlled by the respective
players
5. The terminal surface is defined by the slow variables only.
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For this class, the original high-dimensional game can be decomposed to a slow
"simple pursuit game" and to two sets of fast, independent, optlmal-control problems
satisfying the conjecture of reference 20.
The objective of this paper is to summarize the results of slngular-perturbation
analysis for a set of pursuit-evaslon games of gradually increasing complexity. In
all of these games, capture is defined as the pursuer approaching the evader within a
predetermined distance and is assumed to be guaranteed. The cost to be optimized is
the "time of capture."
The scope of the paper is, however, limited to two recently completed investiga-
tions. In section II the three-dimensional, constant-speed pursuit-evasion game is
analyzed, and it is shown how the singular-perturbation solution (ref. 24) enlightens
the apparent controversy raised in previous works (refs. 25-27). The results of a
comparison (ref. 28) of the zero-order feedback approximation, obtained by singular-
perturbation analysis (ref. 29), and the open-loop optimal solution of variable-speed
horizontal pursuit-evasion game (ref. 30) are presented in section III. This compari-
son has validated the singular-perturbation approach for the analysis of complex
pursuit-evasion games for sufficiently large initial distances. In the concluding
section, the merits of such game analysis are summarized.
II. THREE-DIMENSIONAL "GAME OF TWO CARS"
Summary of Two-Dimensional Results
As a first example of a singularly perturbed pursuit-evasion game, the two-
dimensional, constant-speed game with constrained turning rates (Game of Two Cars) was
analyzed in reference 22, since its optimal solution (ref. 31) was available for com-
parison. This optimal solution, obtained for a sufficiently large initial distance,
requires that each player uses his maximum turning rate until the final line of sight
is reached. Then the game continues as a straight line pursuit.
The singular-perturbation parameters in this problem are the ratio of the turning
radii of the players to the initial distance of separation. The approximate strategy
pair for this game, obtained by using the singular-perturbation technique, is given
in a feedback form. It directs the players to align their velocity vectors with the
current line of sight. If both players can do it simultaneously, the approximate
strategies yield a result which is identical to the exact solution. Otherwise, the
extended value will shift in favor of the player who reaches the current line of
sight later than his opponent. Numerical comparison showed that the payoff accuracy
of the approximation is better than the predicted order of _2. This successful
demonstration of merits of the singular-perturbation approach encouraged investigation
of more complex pursuit-evasion game models, such as (i) three-dimensional, constant
speed; (2) two-dimensional, variable speed; and (3) three-dimensional, variable speed.
In the following subsection the first game model is formulated, _sing vector
notations.
Problem Formulation
The equations of motion of the constant-speed pursuit-evasion in a three-
dimensional space are
d-_ =VE - Vp ; _(t o) = Ro (i)
dVp . . .
dt = _P x Vp ; _p(to) = Vp (2)
0
_ d_E -
• dt = WE x VE ; E(to)= VE (3)
The angular velocity vectors .up,m E are perpendicular to the respective vectors of
linear velocity, that is,
: Up. Vp = wE" VE = 0 (4)
and they are constrained in magnitude,
" _pl _ _p (5)
]E 1 _ _E (6)
The game terminates at t = tf, when the two following conditions are satisfied for
the first time:
, -.I_(tf)l = d (7)
a__
IR(tf) l < 0 (8)dt
It was shown (ref. 32) that if l_pl > I_EI and _p > _m then a finite capture
time can be always guaranteed. In the sequel, it is assumed that these inequalities
are respected. It permits the definition of a game of degree (ref. i) in which the
cost to be optimized is the time of capture tf, defined as
= tf _ min arg IR(t)I = d (9)
t>t o l_ol>d
The controls of the players are mp and mE, respectively, and their optimal values
have to satisfy the necessary saddle-point conditions of
min max,_ = max min,_'= 0 (i0)
Up wE wE Up
where _ is a scalar function (the Hamiltonian of the game) given by
J{= 1 + _R" (VE - Vp) + XVp" (_p x Vp) + XVE- (wE × VE) (Ii)
. _v .The adjoint vectors XR, p,XVg are the components of the gradient of the cost func-
tion (assuming that such a gradient exists) and they have to satisfy
d%R -+
d-_-= _ = 0 _ XR = const (12)
_R
,+
dXVp _ . . .
dt =- _= _R + (_P × _Vp) (13)
= )dt _VE E
The transversality conditions, applied at the terminal surface defined by equa-
tion (7), lead to
R(tf) 11R(tf) (15)
.
_Vp(tf) = XVE(tf) = 0 (16)
.
It can be thus concluded from equations (12) and (15) that )tR(t ) is a constant vector
parallel to the final line of sight and that its magnitude can be determined from
equation (10) applied at the terminal manifold,
_. __ .
R" [Vp(tf) - VE(tf)] = i (17)
The optimal-control strategies are obtained from equation (i0), using also equa-
tions (5) and (6):
Vp × Vp
Up = _p (18)
I_Vp .x VpI
VE × VE
WE = -_E (19)
I_VE .x VEI
These expressionsreflect the requiredperpendicularityexpressedin equation (4).
The set of necessaryconditionsof game optimalityand the equationsof motion
representa nonlinear,two-point,boundary-layerproblemwith 6 three-dimensional
vector variables. In the next subsection the optimal solution is approximated, using
the singular-perturbationtechnique.
Zero-Order Feedback Approximation
The first step in applying singular-perturbation analysis is the transformation
of the original problem to exhibit a singularly perturbed structure. The results of
the two-dimensional analysis (ref, 22) suggest that if the turning radius of the
players, defined by
: r (20)
r
is small relative to the initial'distance of separation I_o , there is a time-scale
separation between trajectory and vehicle dynamics which can be demonstrated by a
scaling transformation. Such a transformation can be avoided by using the technique
of "forced" singular perturbations, proposed first by Kelley (ref. 33) and used since
in many optimal-control problems (refs. 34-37). This method is based on the insertion
of a unit-value, "artificial" perturbation parameter as a multiplier of the respective
time derivatives of the fast variables. Judicious ordering of the state variables,
representing the actual hierarchy of the time-scale separations, is an essential pre-
requisite for a meaningful approximation. Recently it was formally demonstrated
(ref. 38) that the "forced" singular-perturbation approach and the properly scaled
transformation of the variables (using singular-perturbation parameters of physical
significance) yield identical zero-order feedback solutions. The example of the
constant-speed two-dimensional game solved by this method in reference 23 illustrated
this equivalence. By using this technique, equations (1)-(3) can be transformed to
dR . . . .
d-_ = (VE - Vp) ; R(t o) = Ro (21)
.
dVp . . . .
_ = (Wp x Vp) ; Vp(to) = Vpo (22)
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dVE . . 2 .
d---t-= (WE × VE) ; VE(to) = VEo (23)
By setting E = 0 the reduced-order game is obtained (variables of this game are
denoted by the subscript o) yielding
dR° .o .o _o (to) .--_-= (VE - Vp) ; = R° (24)
and the constraints
.0 2_ .o 2o
(Up x Vp) = (wE × VE) = 0 (25)
Combining equations (25) and (4) leads to
.o .o
Up = wE = 0 (26)
In this reduced game, the controls are _ and _, and they have to satisfy
min max'= max min,YC °= 0 (27)
20 20 .o 20
Vp VE VE Vp
where
.o .o .o
._o = i + XR. (VE - Vp) (28)
The adjoint vector _ satisfies an equation similar to equation (12), and conse-
quentl x it is a constant vector, parallel to the final llne of sight of the reduced
game R°(tf).
Optimization of the reduced-order Hamiltonian _° leads to
_o
V+_ = IVeleR(tf) (29)
4 o
_ = IVEIeR(tf) (30)
_o
where eR is a unit vector in the _o direction. We also obtain from equation (27)
that
+o
eR(t f)
(31)_o =
R Iv r-Iv l
The solution of the reduced game is therefore a straight-line pursuit. Substi-
tuting equations (29) and (30) into equation (21) indicates that the direction of the
line of sight does not change in this subgame, that is, _°(tf) is parallel to _o,
and consequently
.° . (32)
eR(tf) = eRo
Since equations (29) and (30) are generally incompatible with the prescribed
and VEo, a boundary-layer game has to be introduced, using ainitial conditions "_o
time-stretching transformation
t - t
o
: (33)
E
By substituting equation (33) into equations (21)-(23), the following set of equations
(variables are denoted by the superscript i) is obtained:
dRI_ S(VE+i i" ; _i= - V_) (0) = _^ (34)
dV_ .i .i .
dT = ($_ × Vp) ; Vp(0) = VPo (35)
d_ .i .i .i (36)
d--_-=(WE × VE) ; VE(0) = _Eo
Setting € = 0 leads to
i(t) = const = Ro (37)
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The Hamiltonian of this boundary-layer game is similar to equation (ii). It is
obtained by expressing the adjoints of the singularly perturbed game equa-
tions (21)-(23) (denoted by the superscript E) as
_R = %R
Vp = _Xgp (38)
XVE =_XVE
.i ">i_ ">i .i .i .i .i .i .i
_i = 1 + _R" (VE Vp) + _Vp" (Wp x Vp) + _VE" (wE × VE) (39)
The adjointequationsof the boundary layer are
d_ 3_i .i
- -s - 0 = kR = const (40)
dT 3_i
d_Vp _i
dr 3Vp
dkVE sjli
. × (42)
- -_R + WE
d_ 3_iE
The matching condition requires
">i ->0
%R = %R (43)
->0
where )_R is already determined by equations (31) and (32). The other adjoint vec-
tors have to satisfy
_ .
_-_olim_Vp(_) = XVp(tf) = 0 (44)
_-_olim_VE(_ ) = _VE(tf) = 0 (45)
The optimality conditions, similar to equation (i0), lead to
_i ->i
Vp x Vp
.i), = _p (46)(_P ">i .i
l Vp×vpl
8
.i .i
AVE × VE.i
(_°E)*= -hE x (47)
It can be already seen that equations (35), (41), (44), and (46) are independent of
equations (36), (42), (45), and (47), and consequently each of the equation sets can
be solved separately.
Substituting equations (43) and (46) into equation (41) yields
d'_pi x Vp x (48).odT = _R + _P .i
•
Using the triple vector product identity
(_ x _) x c = _(_. _) - _(_" _) (49)
we can rewrite equation (48) in a simplified form,
d_p
.o .i .i
d---_ = XR + klXVp + k2V P (50)
where k I and k2 are scalar multipliers. Integrating equation (50) backwards from
.i
%Vp(tf) = 0, we observe that initially the derivative vector lies in the plane
.i .i
defined by _ and Vp. Consequently, the vector %Vp itself will grow (in the
retrograde sense) in this plane only and can be expressed by
_p(_) = k3(T)_._+ k4(_)V._ (51)
Substituting equation (51) into equation (46) reveals that
_o ×
R _ (52)+i
(Up)* = _p .o .i
IXR x Vel
Similarly we obtain for the evader
(53).i
_o
Since by equations (31) and (32) %R is parallel to R0, we have the control strate-
gies in the form
. .i
Ro × Vp (54)
.i
These boundary-layer strategies imply that each vehicle should turn in the plane
defined by the initial line-of-sight vector and its own velocity. A uniformly valid
composite zero-order feedback solution (denoted by the superscript c) is obtained if
the initial condition Ro is replaced in equations (54) and (55) by the current
value of the line-of-sight vector R (and the superscripts i omitted):
.
->c R x Vp
mp = _p (56)
.c R ×V E
mE = mE . (57)
×VEi
The accuracy of this approximation depends on the time-scale separation of the
variables, that is, on the smallness of the perturbation parameters
= rj/IRol j = P, Ecj (58)
where r is defined in equation (20).
The Optimal Solution
To our knowledge, the complete optimal solution of the game has not been pub-
lished. Moreover, the results that are available have created some controversy. In
several investigations (e.g., refs. 26 and 27) it was indicated that the three-
dimensional game tends to take place in an inclined plane. In a recent paper
(ref. 28) it is shown, however, that the optimal strategies of this game, starting
with noncoplanar initial conditions, are essentially three dimensional. The singular-
perturbation analysis can resolve this apparent contradiction. As a matter of fact it
extends the original two-dimensional solution of Simakova (ref. 31) to a three -
dimensional space. Applying the same approach that was taken in the boundary-layer-
game equations (48)-(54) to the exact-game equations (i)-(19) shows that the optimal
maneuvers of the players take place in two fixed planes, determined by the final
(a priori unknown) direction of the line of sight and the respective velocity vectors.
This open-loop solution, expressed in a nonrotating coordinate system, embeds the
results of references 25-27, showing that they are complementary and do not contradict
each other. The optimal strategies obtained in reference 27 are expressed in a coor-
dinate system aligned with the line of sight and, therefore, the existence of the
fixed maneuver planes is not transparent. It also agrees with the observation that if
the game starts in (or reaches) a plane, the optimal trajectories are two dimensional.
i0
It is also obvious that if the ratios of the turning radii of the respective
players to the initial distance of separation (i.e., the singular-perturbatlon param-
eters of the game) are small, the rotation of the llne-of-sight vector is negligible,
and the current direction of this vector, used in the zero-order feedback strategies,
is a good approximation to its final orientation.
III. VARIABLE-SPEED HORIZONTAL PURSUIT-EVASION
Singular-Perturbatlon Analysis
In variable-speed pursuit-evasion games there exists also a tlme-scale separation
between the velocity and turning dynamics of the players. For such cases the method
of forced singular perturbations is particularly rewarding since it has the potential
to generate a multiple time-scale differential game. Such a singularly perturbed
game, consisting of several consecutively faster subgames, is solvable in a closed
form. An example of the variable-speed pursuit-evasion game in the horizontal plane
was analyzed first in reference 29. Only recently has it become possible to validate
this analysis (ref. 28) by comparing its solution with the open-loop optimal solution
of the same game (ref. 30).
Because of the limited scope of the present paper, only the main results of the
singular-perturbation analysis and the more important aspects of the comparison are
summarized in this section. For further details the reader is referred to the
original report (ref. 28).
For the forced slngular-perturbation analysis, the variable-speed pursuit-evasion
game between two airplanes in the horizontal plane is described by the following
multiple time-scale mathematical model (variables are defined in fig. i):
= VE cos(× E - _) - Vp cos(Xp - _) ; R(t o) = R° (59)
= [VE sin(xE - _) - Vp sin(Xp - _)]/R ; _(to) = _o (60)
£Vp = g[_p(Tmax) P - (Do)P - n_(Di)p]/W P ; Ve(to) = Vp (61)
o
£VE = g[_E(Tmax)E - (Do)E - nE(Di)E]/WE ; VE(to) = VE (62)
o
_2_e = g(n_ - I)I/2/Vp ; ×e(to) = _e (63)
o
_2XE = g(n_ - I)I/2/V E ; ×m(to ) = ×E (64)
o
In this model, the maximum thrust of the airplanes "Tmax," as well as their
zero-lift drag "Do" and the straight-flight-induced drag "Di," is a known function of
the velocity. Weight W is assumed to be constant. The control variables of the
players are the throttle setting
0 S _ S i (65)
and the aerodynamic load factor (or lift to weight ratio)
A
n = (L/W) (66)
This last control variable is subject to two different constraints; a structural limit
n _ nma x (67)
and an aerodynamic (speed-dependent) one:
n _ nL(V ) (68)
Singular perturbation analysis (refs. 28 and 29) leads to an approximation of the
optimal-control strategies in an explicit feedback form. These strategies are similar
for both players. They require full thrust
_c = I (69)
and a load factor given by the equation
V Tmax - (Do + Di)
(nC)2 = i + VVr-_ " D.I [i -cos(! - X)] (70)
but subject to the constraints of equations (67) and (68). In this expression, Vr
is the velocity in the reduced-order game, which is estimated to be the maximum
velocity of the aircraft.
As can be seen, equation (70) expresses the required load factor as an explicit
function of the state variables (i,×,V) and the performance parameters (thrust, drag)
of the airplanes. Note that no range measurements or estimation of the opponent's
parameters are required. Based on equation (70), a simple feedback chart, as shown
in figure 2, can be prepared for each airplane.
The very form of equation (70) provides an important insight into the nature of
the suboptimal maneuver, which can be summarized as follows:
i. The required load factor can be related to the highest constant speed (sus-
tained) turning performance since
tTmax - (Do + Di)i(, O) (71)i
indicating the compromise between a fast turn and longitudinal acceleration, both
being necessary for a successful pursuit-evasion.
2. The function [I - cos(_ - X)] 1/2 is almost linear for I¢ - XI < 60°.
Therefore, the required turning rate can be considered, for small deviations from the
line of sight, as a proportional control with a speed-dependent gain.
3. A part of this gain, given by V/(V r - V), provides an additional insight.
It indicates that if the speed is near its predicted value in the reduced game (i.e.,
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when there is a littleneed for acceleration), a faster turn can be made. However,
if (Vr - V) is large, it is better not to lose velocity by making a sharp turn, but
to use the excess thrust for acceleration.
4. The control strategies (eqs. (69)-(70)) predict that the trajectory of both
airplanes will asymptotically approach the line-of-slght vector and that the engage-
ment will end by an accelerating "tail chase."
Comparison with the Optimal Solution
The zero-order feedback approximation obtained by singular-perturbation analysis
was compared recently (ref. 28) with the open-loop optimal solution of the same game
(ref. 30). This solution is based on using the direction of the terminal line of
sight as a reference. In this particular coordinate system, the necessary conditions
of game optimality are decoupled into two one-sided optimization problems. Thus,
extremal trajectories can be generated by backward integration from the terminal sur-
face independently. A recent implementation of this approach (ref. 39) makes it pos-
sible to compare trajectories and time-histories of variables to suboptimal candi-
dates_ such as the zero-order feedback approximation. Initial conditions of an
example are depicted in figure 3. Those initial conditions were obtained by simul-
taneous backward integration of two different trajectories (one for the pursuer and
one for the evader) from different end conditions satisfying Vp(tf) > VE(tf), using
an identical aircraft model from the open literature (ref. 40). Note that the initial
separation in the x-direction can be adjusted by selecting different capture ranges
(Rf = d).
The time-histories of the control variables seem to be similar, even for a rela-
tively short initial range (only 4 times larger than the pursuer's turning radius),
as can be seen in figures 4 and 5. Inspection of turning time-histories in figures 6
and 7 reveals more differences between the optimal solution and the feedback approxi-
mation. The evader, using the suboptimal strategy, reaches the actual line of sight
very nearly at the same time as the open-loop optimal trajectory closely approaches
the final (reference) direction. His turning strategy can, therefore, be considered
as close to optimal. One cannot say the same about the pursuer. Since the initial
conditions of the pursuer are more favorable than those of the evader, the pursuer
can reach the llne of sight in a shorter time. Because the evader has not yet com-
pleted his turn, the line of sight continues to rotate. Consequently, the pursuer,
using a suboptimal strategy, has made an unnecessary turn (an overshoot) which has to
be corrected later. As a result, it can be expected that the capture time of the
suboptimal game will be longer than the optimal one. Indeed, for this example, the
time of capture predicted by the feedback approximation is about 6.5% higher than the
optimal value of 97.1 sec.
The major reason for this level of inaccuracy is the relatively large value of
the singular-perturbation parameter (_p = rp/R o = 0.25) in the example. By changing
the capture range Rf, and accordingly the initial distance of separation Ro, a large
set of pursuit-evaslon games is generated and the suboptimal outcomes of the games
are compared with the optimal time of capture. The results of this comparison, pre-
sented in figure 8, demonstrate a very satisfactory accuracy for small Values
(gp < 0.125) of the perturbation parameter. Since in this example the turning
requirement of the pursuer is less than that of the evader, the suboptimal strategy
of the pursuer deviates more from the optimal than that of the evader. Consequently
the actual time of capture obtained when both players are using zero-order feedback
strategies is longer than the optimal value.
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In summary, the zero-order, singular-perturbation strategies preserve all of the
essential elements of the optimal solution and provide a good payoff accuracy for
sufficiently large initial distances.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that singular-perturbation methods are useful mathematical
tools for analyzing a class of interesting nonlinear pursuit-evasion games. The
explicit analytical form of the zero-order control strategies indicates the simplicity
of an eventual implementation. This point is emphasized by the fact that in spite of
the assumption of perfect information made in the game formulation, the suboptimal
strategies depend only on the relative geometry and on own-state measurements.
The analytical approximation generates an insight, which hardly can be obtained
from an open-loop optimal solution. This point has been clearly illustrated in both
examples discussed here. The payoff accuracy of the zero-order, singular-perturbation
approximation was demonstrated for a variable-speed pursuit-evasion game in the hori-
zontal plane.
Variable-speed pursuit-evasions in the vertical plane and in three-dimensional
space were also analyzed recently by using a variable-modeling forced singular-
perturbation technique. This last investigation is reported in a contemporary
paper (ref. 41).
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